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ARTICLES
AUCTIONING CLASS ACTION AND
DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS
Randall S. Thomas* & Robert G. Hansen**
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous legal academics and practitioners have criticized the han-
dling by plaintiffs' attorneys of large-scale class action and derivative
lawsuits.1 These critiques point out attorneys' abuse of the legal system,
ranging from purported collusion among plaintiffs' and defendants'
* Randall S. Thomas is an Associate Professor of Law at the College of Law, University of
Iowa; B.A. 1977, Haverford College; M.A. 1979, Ph.D. 1983, J.D. 1985, University of Michigan.
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School, Dartmouth College; B.A. 1979, Northern Michigan University; Ph.D. 1984, University of
California, Los Angeles.
Professor Hansen acknowledges financial support from The Tuck Associates. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Ian Ayres, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Michael D.
Green, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Geoffrey P. Miller, John C. Reitz, Edward B. Rock, the participants
of the American Law and Economics Association Second Annual Meetings' panel on "Theoretical
Issues Regarding Litigation and Settlement," and the participants of the Finance Seminar Series of
the Amos Tuck School at Dartmouth College. The authors would also like to acknowledge Laurie
A. Harmon and Christopher C. Wren for their assistance in researching this Article.
1 See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1987)
[hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A
Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, The Plaintiff's Attorney];
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48
No. 3 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion]; John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is
Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney Gen-
eral]; Leo Herzel & Robert K. Hagan, Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Derivative and Class Actions, 7
No. 2 LrrlG. 25 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 55 (1991) [hereinafter Romano, The Shareholder Suit]; Roberta Ro-
mano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155 (1990);
Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (1989).
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counsel in settling cases to excessive charges by attorneys for prosecuting
these cases. 2 Plaintiffs, with little stake in the litigation, collectively face
tremendous problems policing the actions of their attorneys. Effective
legal reform, several commentators have argued, requires joining the in-
terests of plaintiffs and their attorneys.3
Judicial auctioning of lawsuits has been suggested as a means of
more closely connecting the ownership and control of class action and
derivative litigation.4 The benefits from auctioning lawsuits to the high-
est bidder are significant: combining the agent and the principal will re-
sult in focused ownership of the case and lead to the use of more efficient
litigation techniques.
A recent article by Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller5
develops this nascent auction idea. Macey and Miller suggest that a
judge should auction suitable class action or derivative claims to the
highest bidder. The proceeds from the auction would be distributed
among the plaintiff class, and the winning bidder would be free to con-
duct the litigation in the manner it believed most appropriate.
In this Article, we apply auction theory to examine two issues raised
by this proposal. First, we analyze the question of who should conduct
the auction, asking whether judges are the preferred auctioneers for these
claims. We conclude that judges would make good auctioneers. In par-
ticular, judicial immunity to suit and judges' ability to enforce auction
rules strictly will result in relatively greater auction proceeds for the in-
jured parties than if other third-party auctioneers are employed. 6
Second, we examine the costs of an auction system, finding them to
be much greater than Macey and Miller recognize.7 In particular, we
focus on three aspects of the cost equation. One, we observe that bidders
2 See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing problems of collusion in
the settlement of derivative actions); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 1, at
232-33 (same); Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 111. The prevalence of these abuses is reflected in
the amount of time and effort that courts invest ensuring that settlements in collective actions are not
tainted by fraud or collusion. See, eg., Malchman v. Davis, 588 F. Supp. 1047, 1059 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (conducting exhaustive review of settlement proposal to determine if there was any fraud or
collusion), modified, 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985); Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (same); 6A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS ED. § 12:124, at 22 (1989) (stating
that a judicial finding of collusion defeats certification).
3 See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 77-79; Herzel & Hagan, supra note 1,
at 27; Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 6; Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 209-15 (1987) [hereinafter Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement].
4 See infra note 66-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of these proposals.
5 Macey & Miller, supra note 1.
6 See infra notes 107-09, 114-15 and accompanying text.
7 On this point, we note that Macey and Miller do point out that there are significant costs to
the auction method. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 110-16. They, however, are "confident" that
the benefits of an auction technique will outweigh the costs. Id. at 110. We are less confident that an
auction system would be an improvement over the existing system, except in those cases where the
initial discovery costs for bidders are very low. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
424
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in an auction have imperfect information about the value of the lawsuit
being auctioned. Applying auction theory, we find that bidders' uncer-
tainty about the value of a lawsuit lowers their bids in the auction. As a
result, injured parties would not receive the expected value of their
claim.8 Bidders could engage in discovery to lessen their uncertainty,
but as we note below, increased discovery could reduce the value of the
auction process.
Two, bidders' information problems are compounded if, as Macey
and Miller suggest, we allow defendants to bid in the auction of the law-
suit brought against them.9 Defendants typically would have significant
informational advantages over other bidders because of their ability to
conduct their own rapid internal investigations of the circumstances sur-
rounding a lawsuit. Outside parties, and even the injured parties them-
selves, would normally need to resort to the legal system's more
cumbersome formal discovery process before they could even begin to
obtain similar information. Bids received at an auction would reflect the
effects of this informational asymmetry. Whatever the defendant bid for
the claims being auctioned, other bidders would be reluctant to bid
higher for fear that they would only win auctions where they overpaid
for the case. This "winner's curse" problem implies that the auction
price always falls short of the expected value of the case. Consequently,
we conclude that defendants should be precluded from bidding in the
auction.
Three, even if we exclude the defendant from the bidding, and per-
mit bidders to engage in some form of discovery as to the merits of the
claim, the auction process may be prohibitively expensive. Under an
auction system, each bidder will need information about the case to es-
tablish the value of the claim being sold. This information can only be
gathered, under the existing rules, through the discovery process. A fun-
damental result of auction theory is that the value of the bid received in
the auction will, on average, be reduced by the aggregate sum of all bid-
ders' discovery costs. 10 The injured parties will therefore bear the burden
of paying for this discovery through lowered auction proceeds. This
problem seems inevitable with the auction mechanism. With the defend-
ants excluded from the auction, settlement, if it happens, will probably
have to occur after the auction takes place. At this point, the bidders will
have already engaged in substantial discovery. As discovery costs will be
subtracted from the winning bid, little, if any, increased efficiency seems
likely to result from auctioning claims where bidders need to engage in
extensive discovery to determine the value of the claim.
8 See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
9 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 108.
10 See Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of
Competition, 57 J. Bus. 417, 424-25 (1984) (deriving general result); Jonathan R. Macey, Auction
Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in Corporate Assets, 25 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 85, 88-90 (1990).
87:423 (1993)
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In light of these implications of auction theory, we conclude that
auctions of class action and derivative lawsuits should have a place, albeit
a restricted one, in our legal system. For that class of cases where the
bidders' costs in determining the value of the claim are low, we believe
that the benefits of eliminating agency costs exceed the costs of the auc-
tion process. Within this limited set of cases, we agree with Macey and
Miller's conclusion that "the auction idea has sufficient merit to warrant
at least a limited experiment to determine whether such a system would
indeed be workable on a larger scale."'"
In the remainder of this Article, we expand on these arguments as
follows: Part II looks at class action and derivative litigation from the
perspective of the agency cost model. After describing current judicial
practice in dealing with such lawsuits, this part examines the benefits of
joining together ownership and control of class action and derivative law-
suits. Part III considers judges as auctioneers, analyzing the traditional
legal rules for auctioneers and comparing this to the legal regime that
would apply to judges as auctioneers. Part IV applies auction theory to
look at the costs of auctioning class action and derivative lawsuits. Fi-
nally, in Part V, we discuss the conditions under which an auction sys-
tem would work.
II. AGENCY COSTS IN CLASS ACTIONS AND DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION
A. Class Actions: Solving a Collective Action Problem
Litigation is an expensive process. For parties with small dollar
claims, the cost of filing and prosecuting a lawsuit may outweigh any
potential recovery, even though society often picks up part of the litiga-
tion costs. 12 Where a large number of parties have suffered a similar
11 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 118. Our recommendation assumes as an objective the
maximizing of the plaintiffs' recovery. This objective might conflict with maximizing economic effi-
ciency. For example, it is conceivable that an auction system would increase the plaintiff class's
recovery but lead to more inefficient settlements if, for instance, settlements did not generally occur
until after the auctions had been conducted.
12 Where the injury suffered is slight in dollar terms or nonpecuniary, this private cost-benefit
analysis can break down, and society can incur substantial costs for a private party's vindication of
its rights. See Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371,
371 (1986) (costs of operating the legal system create a divergence between actual private incentives
to sue and socially optimal results); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring
Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334 (1982) (same). For example, a California
attorney recently won an appeal in his suit against the federal government's use of metal detectors in
the federal courthouse in downtown Los Angeles. The attorney's shoes contained a metal shank
which set off the metal detector, and he was required to take off the shoes and enter the courthouse
in his socks. This, the attorney claimed, was humiliating. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the attor-
ney should be allowed to bring this action and reversed the district court's dismissal of the action.
The filing fee for the appeal was $100. The estimated cost to the public of this suit was over $5,600
for the appellate court's time alone. See Amy Stevens, Lawyer Gets Chance To Appeal The Case Of
Alarming Shoes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1991, at B6.
426
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injury, however, American law provides a device that enables the injured
parties to band together to pursue their claims: the class action. The
class action aims to overcome the collective action problems inherent in
any effort to organize a large group of individuals into one common
project. 13
Under the class action rules, a representative plaintiff can file an
action and ask the court to certify her as the class representative. If the
plaintiff and her attorney can satisfy the procedural prerequisites for cer-
tification, the court can certify the case as a class action that will bind all
members in the defined class. 14 The case will then proceed in the same
manner as other litigation. The principal difference, for our purposes, is
that the named plaintiff has little, if any, control over the conduct of class
action litigation.15
B. Derivative Lawsuits: Shareholders Monitoring Management?
Corporations have standing to bring suit to remedy wrongs done
them by third parties. As with any corporate action, the initial responsi-
bility for bringing this action lies with the corporation's management.
However, management may choose for self-interested reasons or other-
wise not to fie an action to enforce the corporation's rights.
The derivative lawsuit empowers a representative shareholder to
step in for management and bring suit on behalf of the corporation. 16
The suit is brought in the corporation's name to enforce its rights against
parties that injured it. Recovery, if obtained, is on behalf of the corpora-
tion, although only after an award of attorney's fees is deducted from it.
In theory, these suits function as a mechanism for shareholders to
monitor managerial misconduct. 17 As many others have noted, when
corporate managers have a small ownership stake in the corporation they
run, the potential exists for them to enrich themselves at the expense of
other shareholders.18 Using the derivative action, shareholders can in
theory police management's diversion of resources to management's own
personal uses.
13 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that the class action is "a tool for overcoming the
free-rider and other collective action problems that impair any attempt to organize a large number of
discrete individuals into any common project").
14 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
15 See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
16 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
17 These liability rules are called into play when primary governance mechanisms-such as the
board of directors, outside stock holders, and executive compensation-fail to monitor managerial
misconduct, but the misconduct is not sufficiently great to cause a change of control. See Romano,
The Shareholder Suit, supra note 1, at 55.
18 In this situation, the interests of the agent are likely to diverge from those of the principal.
For a detailed discussion of this problem, see generally, Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON.
305 (1976).
87:423 (1993)
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However, a recent empirical study argues that "shareholder litiga-
tion is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance." 19
Additionally, some critics have claimed that the device is frequently
abused, with multiple lawsuits being filed by entrepreneurial attorneys at
the announcement of any extraordinary transaction by a corporation.20
The courts, perhaps attempting to rein in this alleged misconduct, have
set strict procedural requirements that govern the bringing of derivative
suits21 and require greater court supervision of the conduct of derivative
litigation.22 The fundamental problem, however, lies in the inability of
named plaintiffs to control effectively their attorneys' conduct.
C. Inefficiencies Created by Attorney Selection and Compensation in
the Existing System of Class Action and Derivative Litigation
In class action and derivative lawsuits, the court has the power to
appoint counsel for the litigation under the rules of civil procedure. 23
For example, the court approves the appointment of class lead counsel,
and will reject the named plaintiff's chosen counsel in certain circum-
stances. 24 In most class action suits, however, the court simply appoints
19 Romano, The Shareholder Suit, supra note 1, at 84. In making these remarks, we do not
intend to imply that shareholders' counsel do not make important contributions to the law through
their actions. Any good corporate law casebook contains numerous decisions in which shareholder
litigation has yielded very large recoveries and where shareholders' counsel has uncovered and effec-
tively prosecuted corporate misconduct. In fact, our analysis suggests that in an auction system,
shareholders' counsel are likely to be the (high) winning bidders.
20 See Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1143-44 (1lth Cir. 1985); Kahn v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., No. 10808, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *8-*9 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989). See also Alexan-
der, supra note 1, at 528; R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 6-7 (1987); Roswell B. Perkins,
Avoiding Director Liability, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1986, at 8; Joseph Flom, "Home Court" is
Best Advantage, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 1991, § I, at 10.
21 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st
Cir.) (stating that the complaint must allege with particularity the reasons for not making demand),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186-87 (Del. 1988) (same); Aron-
son v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1983) (same).
22 See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 656-59 (1986) for a discussion of the court's role in
the settlement process.
23 See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d), which allows the trial court to make appropriate orders
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition
or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of
the members of the class... that notice be given... to some or all members of any step in the
action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to...
intervene and present claims or defenses; . . . (3) imposing conditions on the representative
parties or on intervenors;... and (5) dealing with similar procedural matters.
Id.
24 The federal courts derive this power from FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1). Percodani v. Riker-
Maxson Corp., 51 F.R.D. 263, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd sub norm, Farber v. Riker-Maxson Corp.,
442 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1971). Where the plaintiff's suggested counsel does not demonstrate the
necessary experience or resources to prosecute an action, the courts have refused to appoint them as
lead counsel. See, e.g., Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 566 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir.
1977).
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the attorney who was first to file the action, rather than others who seek
to intervene later.25
The court's authority extends to naming counsel where several class
or derivative actions are consolidated.2 6 Judicial attempts to ensure effi-
cient prosecution of these actions can also take the form of the designa-
tion of a "Plaintiffs' Committee" whose members are compensated for
their work for the class.27 Intense negotiations are often conducted
amongst plaintiffs' counsel for positions on these committees.28
Lead counsel, or the Plaintiffs' Committee, can be given substantial
authority to conduct the litigation, even to the exclusion of other coun-
sel.29 For example, in In re Ivan Boesky Securities Litigation,30the Sec-
ond Circuit vested the lead counsel with virtually all the responsibilities
listed in the Manual for Complex Litigation.31
Discovery efforts of the plaintiffs' counsel are generally coordinated
by the lead counsel.32 Discovery can include several forms of informal
and formal fact-finding: document review and document production re-
quests, witness interviews and depositions of witnesses, drafting multiple
rounds of interrogatories and working with expert witnesses. 33 This dis-
covery can be very costly and time consuming, both for the parties and
25 See, ag., Schatte v. International Aliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 183 F.2d 685, 687
(9th Cir. 1950). This practice has the effect of rewarding attorney search activity. See infra note 39
for further discussion of this point.
26 See, ag., Feldman v. Hanley, 49 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In this case, the court granted
the defendant's request to appoint a lead counsel, despite some of the plaintiff's objections, stating
that lead counsel would "merely supervise and coordinate the conduct of plaintiffs' cases." Id. at 51
(quoting MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1958)).
27 See, eg., In re Air Crash Disaster v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). In
this consolidated action involving more than 150 claims for death and injuries arising out of the
crash of an Eastern Airlines passenger plane, the court appointed a "Plaintiffs' Committee" as "lead
counsel" for the plaintiffs. The court awarded compensation to the Committee for its work as lead
counsel by ordering each attorney, save those who had actively participated in pretrial activities, to
pay the Committee part of the fee she was entitled to receive from her client. Id. at 1008. For
discussions of the creation of plaintiffs' committees, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LTIGATION 2D
§ 20.221 (5th ed. 1982) and 2 H. NEWBERO, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 284 (2d ed. 1985).
28 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 1, at 909; Coffee, Rescuing The Private At-
torney General, supra note 1, at 274-78.
29 In re Air Crash, 549 F.2d at 1015.
30 948 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1991).
31 Id. at 1360.
The Manual for Complex Litigation summarizes the responsibilities of lead counsel as follows:
Lead counsel ordinarily have major responsibility for formulating and presenting positions on
substantive and procedural issues during the litigation. Typically they act for the group-either
personally cr by coordinating the efforts of others-in presenting written and oral arguments
and suggestions to the court, working with opposing counsel in developing and implementing
plans for conduct of the litigation, initiating and organizing discovery requests and responses,
conducting the principal examination of deponents, employing experts, arranging for support
services, and seeing that schedules are met.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D § 20.221 (1985).
32 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D § 20.221 (1985).
33 See generally 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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for the court, because both sides frequently resist the opposing attorneys'
discovery requests. 34 For consolidated actions, all of the plaintiffs' dis-
covery requests are generally grouped together so that the defendant has
to respond to only one request and unnecessary duplication of effort can
be avoided.35
Lead counsel also plays a significant role in the settlement of class
actions and derivative lawsuits. The lead attorney must give notice of a
settlement to the class members and the other attorneys. However, the
lead attorney has authority to negotiate and propose a settlement to the
court without obtaining the approval of every plaintiffs' attorney in-
volved in the matter.36 If the court approves the settlement, a require-
ment in any class action or derivative suit for the settlement to become
effective, 37 the court must still determine the amount of attorneys' fees it
will award to the plaintiffs' attorneys.38
Significant costs arise from the selection of inefficient attorneys to
act as lead counsel. The current practice for selecting the plaintiffs' at-
torney seems to be concerned more with awarding the control of the liti-
gation to the first attorney who files, or to those attorneys who can
negotiate strong positions in the Plaintiffs' Committee, than with the effi-
cient prosecution of the case.39 Efficiency would require that some
method be used to ascertain the comparative effectiveness and cost of the
different attorneys handling the case. The case should then be assigned
to that attorney offering the best combination of these two factors.4°
Under the current system, once selected, the plaintiffs' attorneys'
PROCEDURE, §§ 15.01-.14 (1992) [hereinafter MOORE ET AL.] for discovery purposes and
techniques.
34 See 2 CARL R. ARON ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, § 25:02 (1987) for a
discussion of discovery costs and delays in class action and derivative suits. For a discussion of
abuses of the discovery process and possible objections to excessive discovery requests, see 2 MOORE
ET AL., supra note 33, at § 15.02[1][a] nn.4, 5 & 14. For a review of costs imposed by discovery on
the courts, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D § 21.42 (1985).
35 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2D § 21.42 (1985).
36 See In re Ivan Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting, however, that
"the failure to communicate and consult with other plaintiffs' counsel is grounds for rejection of the
settlement").
37 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1797, 1797.1 (1990).
38 See, e.g., Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61, 66-78 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
39 In part, courts are rewarding search activity by appointing the first filing attorney as lead
counsel. As Macey and Miller point out, an auction system must make specific provisions to reward
search activity if we believe that these search activities are beneficial. See Macey & Miller, supra
note 1, at 106. However, the net impact on search activity of directly compensating the first filing
attorney is unclear. If existing incentives are adequate, and the revised system increases the rewards
for being the first to file, it could provide even greater incentives to file cases without adequate
investigation of their merits. Likewise, if the change in the compensation system reduces the incen-
tives to engage in search, suboptimal search activities could result.
40 It is, however, still possible that an efficient mix of legal resources for prosecuting any given
suit will involve a syndicate of various law firms. See Robert G. Hansen, Firms and Syndicates:
430
HeinOnline  -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 430 1992-1993
Auctioning Lawsuits
incentives are governed by the method of their compensation.41 Attor-
ney compensation in common fund cases, where the plaintiffs' attorneys
can point to a fund that they have generated through the litigation for
the benefit of the class,42 is presently calculated by one of two basic meth-
ods: the lodestar method 43 or the percentage method.44 The different
compensation methods produce different inefficiencies.
The lodestar method of determining attorneys' fees requires the
judge to take a reasonable number of hours expended by the plaintiffs'
attorneys and multiply it by a reasonable hourly rate to compute a "lode-
star" amount.45 This amount is then adjusted, where needed, to take
account of certain factors, including such things as the risk of losing the
case.
The lodestar method's obvious problem is that it gives attorneys lit-
tle incentive to control hours and costs; as long as fees are less than any
settlement, the attorney can be reasonably sure of having most of his
costs paid for.46 Attempts by judges to investigate critically the reasona-
bleness of certain activities undertaken by the attorney are unlikely to be
successful. 47 Indeed, judicial supervision could worsen the situation by
making certain classes of activities especially prone to judicial review and
therefore risky to undertake, from the point of view of the attorney.
Consequently, there would be a tendency to avoid these activities even in
cases where they would benefit the plaintiffs.
The lodestar compensation method can also generate incentives for
inefficient settlements. If the attorney is confident that additional hours
will be paid for, then there is really no incentive to accept a settlement at
any time: the attorney should continue to prosecute the case as long as
possible.48 On the other hand, if the attorney is uncertain whether a
judge will allow additional hours to be paid for, then the incentive will be
Efficient Structure For Transactions Oriented Industry (Sept. 1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Northwestern University Law Review).
41 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 527-57; Coffee, The Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 1, at 670;
Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, supra note 3, at 193.
42 The common fund doctrine is an exception to the general American rule that each party bears
its own attorneys' fees. See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing
the Problem, 1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 435.
43 The lodestar method was first formulated in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973).
44 See, e-g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
45 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 22, 50.
46 See Herzel & Hagan, supra note 1, at 25.
47 See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 12-27, 44-50 (discussing the general problem of one,
monitoring the activities of attorneys-especially in derivative suits-and two, judicial review of
settlement negotiations and fee requests).
48 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 535-48 (discussing the effects of the lodestar method, inter
alia, on the plaintiffs' counsel); Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, supra note 3, at 202-03
(discussing generally the nonoptimal settlement effects when a plaintiff's attorney controls the settle-
ment and is paid under an hourly compensation method).
87:423 (1993)
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for the attorney to settle immediately, rather than incur additional hours
for which he will not be compensated. This would be the case even if
additional work would increase the likely settlement value of the case to
the plaintiffs by a significant amount. Thus, it is unclear whether the
application of the lodestar method generally causes settlements to be
reached too early or too late.
Additionally, the lodestar method gives little economic incentive for
efficient prosecution of the case. For example, there is little incentive
under the lodestar compensation method for the plaintiffs' attorneys to
monitor their overall efforts to ensure that the case is proceeding so as to
maximize the value of the settlement. The overall prosecutorial effort
should be expected to be mediocre, for more effective prosecution would
only result in more money for the plaintiffs and, if anything, fewer billa-
ble hours for the attorney.
The percentage method in class actions and derivative litigation,
which has become more popular in recent years, resembles the contin-
gent fee award in ordinary litigation. Under this method, fees are
awarded based on a fixed percentage of the fund created by the litigation.
Percentage compensation methods will generally give attorneys the
proper incentive to control legal costs, for there is no direct compensa-
tion for additional hours billed. Payments to the attorney will increase
with additional effort only if that additional effort results in a higher set-
tlement. But therein lies the problem with percentage compensation: if
the attorney spends resources to increase the settlement, she can look
forward only to receiving a fraction of the increase. This means that the
attorney will generally devote too little effort to increasing the settlement.
For example, if an additional hour of effort increases the expected pro-
ceeds by $500, that effort will not be undertaken if the attorney's hourly
cost is $200 and her anticipated additional compensation is twenty per-
cent of the increase in the settlement ($100 in this case).
For this reason, we will expect to see too-early settlement for too-
low of an amount. Of course, attorney compensation could be adjusted
using a progressive percentage structure, where the attorney's contingent
fees would increase with the size of the recovery, or the stage of the liti-
gation.49 If such a system could be properly constructed, it would more
closely align the attorney's and the client's interests. It would not, how-
49 For a discussion of attempts to circumvent this effect using a sliding-scale method, see Miller,
Some Agency Problems in Settlement, supra note 3, at 201-02. Miller discusses the potential benefits
of providing a sliding scale for contingent fees "based on a rough proxy for the amount of work the
attorney has performed." Id. at 201. Miller gives as an example an agreement where the attorney
gets a 20% fee if the case settles before pretrial motions are decided, a 25% fee if the case is settled
before trial, a 30% fee if the case is tried and won but not appealed, and a 35% fee if the case is
appealed by the defendant. He concludes that this approach has merit in that it equalizes the returns
to attorneys from settling cases at different stages of the litigation, but that it is at best a rough
corrective measure. Id.
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ever, guarantee "that the settlement figure that the attorney would accept
would give the client a return equal to the client's return from trial."50
Our analysis of the agency costs inherent in class action and deriva-
tive lawsuits conflicts with the received legal model of the attorney-client
relationship. This model presumes that the attorney is the agent of the
client. Under the legal profession's ethical rules, the attorney has a duty
to advance the client's interests to the furthest extent permissible.51 Cli-
ents are said to keep watch over their attorneys using monitoring de-
vices,52 bonding mechanisms, 53 and incentive structures.5 4
Reality is a dim reflection of this model. Despite the strictures of
the received legal model of the attorney-client relationship, the plaintiffs'
attorney, not the plaintiffs, in these actions controls the conduct of every
important aspect of the litigation.55 Bonding mechanisms are weak and
ineffective. 56 The divergence of attorney and client interests may be so
wide as to render it almost impossible to create strong incentives for
plaintiffs' attorneys to act in their clients' best interests.5 7 Individual
plaintiffs cannot, by themselves, effectively control the agency costs that
arise from the attorney-client relationship in these cases.
Nor do judges, in the existing legal system, provide a reasonable
proxy for effective client involvement in the lawsuit. For example, judi-
cial review of settlements does not adequately protect the injured parties'
interests, for judges have a strong interest in approving the settlement,
50 Id. at 201-02. Clermont and Currivan suggest that these problems could be eliminated
through the use of a fee structure that included both hourly and contingent fees. Kevin M. Cler-
mont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 578-85
(1978).
51 Macey & Miller, supra note I, at 12.
52 Id. at 13-15. Clients have some methods of monitoring an attorney's conduct. Some exam-
ples of client monitoring include assessing attorneys' reputation before hiring them and getting sec-
ond opinions from other lawyers. The legal regulatory system also has a number of features
designed to reduce these monitoring costs, such as bar admissions requirements and retention of
good standing in the bar. Id.
53 Id. at 16-17. Several bonding mechanisms exist for lawyers. For instance, the lawyer will not
engage in egregious misconduct for fear of both losing her right to practice law and suffering harm to
her reputation. Id.
54 Id. at 17-19. Incentive structures that reduce the disparity between the client's and the attor-
ney's interests can act as partial, but incomplete, methods of aligning the interests of the two. Incen-
tive devices include compensation methods for attorneys and the lawyer's basic ethical obligations
under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Id. For further discussion of the problems
caused by existing compensation methods in class actions and derivative lawsuits, see supra notes 41-
50 and accompanying text.
55 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 19-20. Client monitoring in derivative and class action
lawsuits fails to effectively align the clients' and attorneys' interests for several reasons. The main
reason is that the class members often have relatively small claims so that the conduct of the litiga-
tion is a matter of little consequence for them. Even clients that might choose to monitor actively
the litigation will have difficulty in doing so because they frequently do not know about the litigation
until they have received the official notice of settlement. Id.
56 Id. at 20-22.
57 Id. at 22-27.
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lack sufficient information to make informed judgments about the fair-
ness of settlements, and cannot rely on the adversary system to provide
them with a balanced view of the proposed settlement.58 Similarly,
judges face tremendous obstacles in trying to review critically attorney
fee applications under the existing formulas.59
D. Auctions of Lawsuits: The Costs and Benefits of Reuniting
Ownership and Control
Numerous critics of the existing system have pointed out these costs
and made proposals to reform the system. Recently, a number of pro-
posals have surfaced for auctioning lawsuits as a method of improving
the legal system's handling of large-scale, small dollar value claims. 60
The leading proponents of the auction model, Professors Macey and
Miller, have described the mechanics of such an auction system as
follows. 61
Whenever a complaint with class action or derivative claims is filed
with the court, a judge would make an initial determination of whether
an auction procedure should be employed. The judge would need to an-
swer several questions, including whether the case was large-scale, small
claim litigation; how many complaints had been filed; how the claims in
the case are defined; and whether there are any other factors that gener-
ally mitigate against auctioning off the claim.62 If the judge determined
that auction treatment was appropriate, she would define the claim being
sold, post notice of the auction to invite bidders to participate, and select
a bidding procedure for the auction. Interested bidders, including the
defendant(s), would have the opportunity to investigate the claim though
discovery.
The auction would then be held, and the claim awarded to the high-
est bidder.63 The winning bidder would pay the amount of its bid to the
court, and the judge would deduct all expenses she determined appropri-
ate, including some amount as compensation for the attorneys that first
fied the suit. Finally, the judge would distribute the net proceeds of the
58 Id. at 45-47.
59 Id. at 48-61.
60 See Herzel & Hagan, supra note 1, at 27; Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 105-16. See also
Coffee, The Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 1, at 691-93 (raising but rejecting idea because of poten-
tial to chill search activity); Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 77-79 (1985) (same).
61 We make no attempt to defend all facets of Macey and Miller's proposal. Instead, we focus in
this paper on several economic issues raised by their proposed auction system. Macey and Miller's
paper addresses many of the obvious difficulties with implementing an auction system, including the
existing legal obstacles to creating an auction system embodied in the doctrines of champerty and
maintenance. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 97-105. We refer the interested reader to their
article for further discussion of those points.
62 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 106.
63 Id. at 107.
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auction to the injured parties. 64
The winning bidder would be free to prosecute the claim in
whatever manner she chose. If the defendant(s) won the auction, they
could cause the suit to be dismissed with prejudice immediately.65
Otherwise, the litigation would proceed in a manner similar to that of
any other claim.
1. Benefits ofAuctions.-Auctioning lawsuits to the highest bidder
unites ownership and control of the lawsuit in one party. The main bene-
fit of such an auction is plain: if the party controlling the prosecution of
the claim owns the claim, agency costs are minimized. 66 Winning bid-
ders would have incentives to prosecute their claims in an economically
efficient manner.
The collective action problems considered inherent in class actions
and derivative lawsuits would be wiped out. For example, no incentives
would exist for collusive settlements between defendants and plaintiffs,
and the courts would not need to spend their time monitoring such settle-
ments to protect the class's interests. 67
Additionally, focused ownership of the suit would improve the con-
duct of the litigation. Winning bidders would reduce the costs of pursu-
ing the claim to maximize their net recovery.68 The incentives under the
current system to increase attorney hours spent in litigation and to pad
expenses would be eliminated.
Finally, the auction mechanism has the added advantage of allocat-
ing the suit being sold to the highest valued bidder.69 The most skilled
law firms who can maximize the net recovery on the claim should, on
average, win the auction. The overall quality of the plaintiff's bar will
benefit from this process, and this effect should spill over to injured par-
ties and corporations.
2. Costs of an Auction System.-An auction system would be diffi-
cult to implement. Macey and Miller identify several problems with an
auction system, including the judge's ability to define the scope of the
claim to be auctioned, the potential for collusion among the bidders, the
possibility of too few or too many bidders emerging at the auction, the
difficulty of arranging financing for bidders, the need to insure the coop-
64 Id.
65 Id. at 108.
66 Id. at 108-09. Agency costs could be completely eliminated if the winning bidder turns out to
be the lawyer who ultimately prosecutes the claim. In any other case, the winning bidder will need
to retain counsel, and consequently, there will remain the agency costs inevitably present between
lawyers and clients in ordinary litigation.
67 Id. at 109.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 109-10.
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eration of the plaintiff class in the case,70 and the necessity of compensat-
ing those attorneys who are the first to file in the litigation for their
search costs. 71 We agree with their analysis and conclusion that these
problems, while serious, can be overcome.
We focus on two important aspects of implementing an auction sys-
tem for lawsuits that Macey and Miller do not address. First, who
should be the auctioneer for lawsuits? Macey and Miller assume that
judges will act as auctioneers, but never ask whether judges would be
good auctioneers. We compare judicial auctioneers to common-law auc-
tioneers to determine whether judicial auctioneers will have the proper
incentives to maximize revenues for injured parties.
Next, we ask how should the bidders be informed about the value of
the lawsuit they are bidding for, and what are the implications of this
information-collecting process for auction bidding levels. Macey and
Miller assume that allowing bidders to engage in discovery before the
auction of the lawsuit will increase auction revenues. Using auction the-
ory, we show that allowing uncontrolled bidder discovery will lead to
lower auction revenues. In fact, we propose that auctioneers permit only
one, relatively thorough, discovery process to take place and that the
results of this discovery be made publicly available to all potential
bidders.
III. SHOULD JUDGES ACT AS AUCTIONEERS?
Courts have experience in auctioning things: companies, manufac-
70 Once the individual plaintiff has received payment after the auction, there would be little
reason for them to cooperate in the conduct of the litigation should testimony or other proof be
needed to establish the claim or the amount of damages. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 114.
These witnesses could be compelled to give testimony through the usual subpoena procedure. Those
plaintiffs not otherwise subject to the court's jurisdiction could be required to agree to give evidence
as a condition of receiving their share of the auction proceeds. Alternatively, we could allow bidders
to offer to pay part of the consideration in the auction in securities whose value depends on the
outcome of the litigation. Contingent payment rights have been used as a method of payment to
shareholders in a corporate buyout. See, e.g., Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp.,
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,799, at 94,190-191 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26,
1989) (merger consideration included contingent payment right securities where the value of the
security depended on the company's future earnings). The use of noncash methods of payment in an
auction can be desirable from both the buyer and the seller's points of view. See Randall S. Thomas
& Robert G. Hansen, A Theoretic Analysis of Corporate Auctioneer Liability Regimes, 1992 Wis. L.
REv. 1147. As Professor Miller has pointed out, however, the use of these securities does raise
several other issues, including the reintroduction of an agency cost by requiring the owner of the
claims to share the fruits of her labor, thereby reducing her incentives to prosecute the claim vigor-
ously. Letter from Geoffrey P. Miller, Professor, University of Chicago Law School, to Randall S.
Thomas, Professor, University oflowa Law School, 2 (Apr. 20, 1992) (on file with the Northwestern
University Law Review).
71 For a general discussion of each of these problems, see Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 111-
15.
HeinOnline  -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 436 1992-1993
Auctioning Lawsuits
tured goods, even the role of lead counsel in class action litigation. 72 In
our current litigation system, if we choose to auction lawsuits, making
the judge the auctioneer of lawsuits seems natural: the trial courts will
have to hear the case if it does not settle, they have broad discretion to
appoint counsel for the class, 73 they have the power to replace class
counsel for inadequate representation of the class, 74 and they can deter-
mine the amount of attorney fees that class counsel are entitled to re-
ceive. 75 Drawing on these powers, and their "fiduciary duty" to protect
the interests of the class, the trial courts already have asserted that they
have the power to conduct auctions of the lead counsel role in class ac-
tion litigation.76 From here it is a short step to assert that the courts
could be empowered to act as class action and derivative suit auctioneers.
Yet, the fact that judges are well positioned to act as auctioneers
does not necessarily mean that they are the best party to assume that
role. For one thing, judges have no economic incentive to insure that the
auction is conducted properly. Under the Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges can have no economic interest in the outcome of a case, and there-
fore cannot be given monetary incentives to sell to the highest bidder.77
Hence, no market mechanism is in place that will act to enforce efficient
judicial auctioneer behavior.
Nor is it clear how the seller can monitor the auction process by
bringing suit against a judicial auctioneer if the auction is not conducted
properly. Judges enjoy immunity from suit for actions they take in fur-
therance of their judicial responsibilities. 78 At first blush, there appears
to be little that a disgruntled injured plaintiff, particularly one with a
small dollar interest in the case, can do to identify or object to a poorly
conducted judicial auction.79
72 See infra Part III.B for further discussion of judges' role as auctioneers in the existing legal
system.
73 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1987); County of Suffolk
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir.
1990).
74 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 1987); Cullen v. New
York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 563-64 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d
846, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1977).
75 The trial court has discretion to determine the amount of attorney fees awarded in a class
action, subject to a general standard of reasonableness. See, eg., Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185,
186 (1st Cir. 1959); Wewoka v. Banker, 117 F.2d 839, 840 (10th Cir. 1941).
76 See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
77 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(c) (1972); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4)
(1988); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(c) (1990).
78 See generally Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991).
79 When the parties' personal stakes in the outcome of the auction are high, they have stronger
incentives to police judicial auctions. For example, in the judicial auction of the Financial News
Network (FNN), the bankruptcy court initially refused to consider a higher bid by Dow Jones
Group W (Dow) because it did not appear to satisfy one of the conditions that the court had im-
posed for bids. In re Financial News Network, Inc., 126 B.R. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter
FNN 1]. Dow promptly appealed this decision to the district court and succeeded in getting the
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In the remainder of this Part, we look more closely at the question
of whether judges should be lawsuit auctioneers. We begin by examining
common-law auctioneers, and identifying the important legal features of
the relationship between the auctioneer and the seller. We then discuss
how a judicial auctioneer would differ from the common-law auctioneer
and whether the injured party is likely to be as well off in an auction
conducted by a judge as in an auction conducted by a common-law
auctioneer.
A. The Common-Law Auctioneer: The Seller's Fiduciary
An auctioneer's job is to get bidders to pay as much as possible for
what she sells.8 0 The auctioneer is charged with getting the best price
possible for the goods"' subject to a minimum reservation price.8 2 If the
bidding does not reach the reservation price set by the seller, or the buyer
fails to pay the purchase price at the required time, then the goods are
not sold, or as an auctioneer would say, "bought in."'8 3
The law views auctioneers as agents of the seller. They must follow
the seller's instructions, seek the highest price, and act consistently with
their fiduciary duties toward their principal.8 4 Furthermore, as the prin-
cipal's agent, the auctioneer cannot purchase or otherwise have an inter-
est in the property which it is employed to sell.85 If the auctioneer
conducts the auction in a negligent manner, the principal has a cause of
bankruptcy court's order reversed and the auction reopened. Id. at 157. Undoubtedly, this appeal
was expensive and would not be cost-justified for any single injured party in the small-claim class
actions we are discussing here.
80 Auctions may take many forms. One important distinction is whether other bidders will
know what others have bid. Open, or oral, auctions result in other bidders learning what the other
bidders have bid. Sealed-bid auctions require the bidders to submit their bids without knowing what
other bidders will do. Bidders' ability to learn what others have bid, as we shall show below, has
important implications for what each bidder will bid. For a general description of the different types
of auctions and their characteristics, see R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bid-
ding, 25 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 699, 702-03 (1987).
81 If bidders know the value to themselves of the goods being sold, that is, their value does not
depend on what other persons believe they are worth, then in an oral auction, bidders will bid up to
the price that reflects their willingness to pay. Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 No.
3 J. ECON. PERsP. 3, 8 (1989). If bidders behave in this way, the item will be awarded to the bidder
who values it most highly for a price equal to the second-highest valuation. Id.
82 Reservation prices keep items from selling at prices below a certain minimum level. For rare
paintings from the Impressionist period, it has been estimated that about one-third of the paintings
put up for auction in the early 1980s were left unsold when the bids made at auction failed to exceed
their reservation price. Orley Ashenfelter, How Auctions Work For Wine and Art, 3 No. 3 J. ECON.
PaRsp. 23, 24 (1989).
83 Id.
84 See, eg., Elco Shoe Mfg., Inc. v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 103 (1932); Cristallina S.A. v. Christie,
Manson & Woods Int'l (Inc.), 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (App. Div. 1986).
85 Moore v. Moore, 5 N.Y. 256, 261 (1851); Holston v. Pennington, 304 S.E.2d 287, 291 (Va.
1983).
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action under agency principles against the auctioneer.3 6
In most auctions, auctioneers have no duties to third parties, such as
disappointed bidders.8 7 An auctioneer's duties to a buyer are also quite
limited 8 unless the auctioneer charges a commission to both the seller
and the buyer.8 9 Where both the seller and the buyer are paying the
auctioneer a commission, the auctioneer can have legal obligations to the
buyer.90
Sophisticated and large auctioneers will carry liability coverage
against suits by bidders and other third parties for actions they took in
the course of their auctioneering duties. If the items sold are sufficiently
valuable, the auctioneer may require the seller to agree to indemnify it
for any risk involved in the sale.91
In most auctions, auctioneers are prohibited from bidding on the
goods that they are auctioning. Because the auctioneer cannot compete
with the bidders, and the auctioneer's reputation and (usually) compen-
sation are tied to obtaining the best possible price for the goods auc-
tioned, 92 the auctioneer has strong incentives to design the auction to
maximize the seller's expected revenues.
Fixing unchangeable rules for the auction before the auction begins
86 See, ag., Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
87 Slaughter v. Guinn, 571 So. 2d 876, 878 (La. Ct. App. 1990). For an excellent discussion of
the development of the common law of auctions, see Anderson v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 120 N.W. 39
(Minn. 1909).
88 The general rule is that the auctioneer is the agent of the buyer only after "the hammer falls"
and only for the limited purpose of presenting written evidence at the time of sale. See Paul L.
Reynolds, Note, Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton: A Caveat to the Horse Trader, 74 Ky. L.J. 889, 909-10
n.140 (1985). Upon the acceptance of the bid, the auctioneer becomes the agent of both the principal
and the purchaser for the purpose of executing the memorandum that takes the transaction out of
the operation of the statute of frauds. United States v. Conrad, 619 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (M.D. Fla.
1985).
89 Although the law treats the auctioneer as the agent of the seller, the large auction houses
typically receive compensation from both the buyer and the seller. DANIEL J. LEAB & KATHARINE
K. LEAB, THE AUCTION COMPANION 32-33 (1981); Ashenfelter, supra note 82, at 27.
90 When an auctioneer is an agent for both the buyer and the seller, this dual agency imposes a
duty on that auctioneer to act fairly to both principals and to disclose all facts which the agent
knows, or should know, would affect the principals' decisions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 392 (1957); Reynolds, supra note 88, at 908 n.132.
91 This is commonly observed in corporate auctions, where the company being sold will agree to
indemnify the investment bankers retained to handle the sale. Thomas & Hansen, supra note 70, at
1181-82.
92 Take the example of the English auction where the bidding begins low and is driven higher by
escalating bids. If the final bid received exceeds the reservation price of the seller, the buyer pays a
percentage of the sale price to the auctioneer, usually a nonnegotiable 10%. Ashenfelter, supra note
82, at 27. The seller also pays a commission equal to a percentage of the sale price, varying between
5% and 15% depending on the type of item being sold. Id If an item goes unsold because the
bidding (or lack thereof) does not exceed the reservation price, the seller still pays the auctioneer a
fee based on a percentage of the reservation price to cover some of the auctioneers' costs of attempt-
ing to auction the item. Id.
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is important if the auction is to maximize revenues. 93 For example, in a
first-price sealed-bid auction, 94 if buyers know that the auctioneer will
not change the rules of the auction after receiving their bids, they will
make their highest bids in the initial (and only) round of bidding. Auc-
tion house auctioneers have the power to guarantee bidders there will be
no sudden rule changes, unlike their corporate counterparts who may
change the rules in midstream because of the dictates of corporate law. 95
The rules of the common-law auction normally require the auction-
eer to award the goods to the highest bidder, subject to the condition that
the price bid is paid promptly. If this condition is satisfied, there is no
need for third-party review of the auctioneer's decision. If, however,
there is some question about whether the highest bidder was awarded the
goods, the seller of the goods could demand a review of the award.96 It is
less certain whether the high bidder could get the award reversed before
the title to the goods passed to the lower bidder, but reputable auction-
eers would undoubtedly try to insure that such an event did not occur. If
the disappointed bidder could bring the matter before a judge, as is often
the case with corporate auctions, the courts might intervene on behalf of
the high bidder. 97
B. Judges as Auctioneers: How Do They Compare With
Common-Law Auctioneers?
In the past, judges have acted as auctioneers in two different set-
tings. The more common setting is when the assets of a bankrupt com-
pany or individual are auctioned to raise money to satisfy the debtor's
obligations. Some recent examples of this type of auction are the bank-
ruptcy courts' auctions of the assets of the Financial News Network
(FNN),98 the sale of Eastern Air Lines slots, gates, and other assets,99
93 The advantage of commitment is that procedures can be adopted that induce the bidders to
bid in desirable ways. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 80, at 703. For example, in sealed-bid
auctions for government contracts, the government agrees that it will award the contract to the
lowest qualified bidder after a single round of sealed bids. This commitment induces bidders to make
their best bids initially. If the government failed to follow this policy in an auction, the cost to it
would be that bidders would not believe it would honor its own rules in the future. This would mean
a loss of future bargaining power. Id.
94 In a first-price sealed-bid auction, the seller solicits sealed bids and awards the item being
auctioned to the highest bidder, who in turn pays the amount of his bid. This can be contrasted to a
second-price sealed-bid auction, where the highest bidder wins but pays the amount of the second
highest bid. See supra note 80 for definition of a sealed-bid auction.
95 Corporate auctioneers of public corporations cannot stop an auction at any particular point in
time because the directors' fiduciary duties require them to consider any higher bid that is received.
See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 70, at 1156-57.
96 See In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
97 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
98 Consumer News and Business Channel Partnership (CNB) acquired the assets of FNN for
$154.3 million in an auction conducted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
440
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Harris Trust & Savings Bank's acquisition of Elgin Clock, 100 and Maxtor
Corporation's successful bid for MiniScribe Corporation. 10 1 A second
and unique form of judicial auction is Judge Walker's innovative decision
to conduct an auction of the right to represent a class of securities law
plaintiffs in In re Oracle Securities Litigation.10 2
In the proposed auction system, judges would conduct auctions of
lawsuits in the same way as any other auctioneer. For instance, judicial
auctioneers, like their common-law counterparts, will seek to maximize
the price received for the goods they are auctioning. The bidding proce-
dures employed, such as an English auction or first-price sealed-bid auc-
York after a long and complex series of maneuvers. Courtroom Auction, COMM. DAILY, May 8,
1991, at 2 (describing the parties' courtroom actions); see also Appeal Called Certain, COMM. DAILY,
May 10, 1991, at 6. The background of this fascinating story and its twists and turns are set forth in
opinions by the District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit. See
FNNI, 126 B.R. 152, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Financial News Network, Inc., 931 F.2d 217,
219-20 (2d Cir. 1991), dismissing appeal from, FNN I, 126 B.R. 152.
99 On February 15, 1991, Chief Judge Burton R. Lifland of the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York approved the sale of 67 slots, five gates, and other assets of
bankrupt Eastern Air Lines, Inc. at Washington D.C.'s National Airport to Northwest Airlines, Inc.
for $35.5 million. Other assets sold included five jetways, ticket counters, office space, and a
clubroom. Judge Approves Eastern Sale to Northwest After Antitrust Divisions Threatens Attack, 60
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1504, at 272 (Feb. 21, 1991).
100 On May 6, 1991, Harris Savings & Trust Bank acquired Elgin Clock & Home Products in an
auction conducted by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See
Terry Troy, Bank Gets Elgin Assets in Liquidation, WKLY. HOME FURNISHINGS, May 20, 1991, at
62.
101 On April 4, 1990, Maxtor Corp., a California-based company, outbid Wearnes Brothers, Ltd.,
a Singapore electronics firm, at the bankruptcy court auction of MiniScribe Corp. Adriel Bet-
telheim, MiniScribe Turmoil Ends with Sale to San Jose Firm, DENVER POsT, Apr. 5, 1990, at Cl.
102 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter Oracle 1]. In that case, Judge Walker instructed
all of the law firms that were competing for the position of lead counsel for the stockholder class to
submit sealed litigation budgets, with reimbursable litigation expenses and percentage of judgment
that counsel would require to take the case. See id. at 690-91. In Oracle I, Judge Walker discussed
his reasons for adopting a competitive bid auction and ordered the various plaintiffs' law firms to
submit bids for the right to represent the class. Id. passim. Subsequently, in In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,
132 F.R.D. 538, 548 (N.D. Cal. 1990) [hereinafter Oracle I1], Judge Walker awarded lead counsel
rights to one of four bidders. Finally, in a post-auction challenge brought by one of the disappointed
law firm bidders, Judge Walker provided some economic and legal justifications for his decision to
use the competitive bid process to determine the lead counsel position. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136
F.R.D. 639, 642-51 (N.D. Cal. 1991) [hereinafter Oracle 111].
The principal advantage of Judge Walker's proposal for auctioning the lead counsel position is
that it increases the winning attorney's incentives to invest in case preparation because she will not
have to share the expected profit of prosecuting the action with other attorneys. Coffee, The Un-
faithful Champion, supra note 1, at 77. However, this procedure has serious drawbacks. For exam-
ple, if the court awards the case to the lowest cost attorney, the unintended consequence may be that
the least competent counsel, who had the lowest costs, wins the bid. To the extent that lawyers' fees
reflect their demand by the market, it seems an undesirable consequence of this method that it could
allocate these cases to the worst attorneys. Id. Furthermore, as Macey and Miller note, this tech-
nique reintroduces significant agency costs because the winning attorney will have incentives to settle
early to obtain a larger profit on the fee. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 113; see also Coffee, The
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 1, at 77-78.
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tion,103 are likely to be identical.
Several features of this type of judicial auction, however, stand in
sharp contrast with the common-law auction. For example, unlike the
common-law auctioneer who gains reputational and frequently direct fi-
nancial benefits for maximizing the price received in an auction, judges
cannot have any financial interest in an auction. 104 Nor is a judge's ap-
pointment as an auctioneer likely to be the result of a competitive bid-
ding process between various judges or auction houses; the parties have
little say in how their bankruptcy proceeding or lawsuit is assigned by
the court system, and only one forum is generally available for the con-
duct of the auction.105 Without these incentives, judges, it could be ar-
gued, may not push the bidders to offer the best price possible.106
The effect of judges' lack of economic incentives is exacerbated by
the parties' inability to police directly the auction process to stop unfair
conduct. Judges are immune from suit by the parties to the auction-
both the bidders and the seller-for actions taken in their judicial capac-
ity in conducting the auction.107 There is no equivalent to the common-
law cause of action available to a seller for negligence committed by an
auctioneer in the conduct of an auction.
However, the seller's inability to bring suit against the judicial auc-
tioneer can have a positive effect on auction revenues. Judges will not
need to purchase liability insurance to protect themselves against claims
of misconduct in the auction. In turn, the seller will not need to worry
about indemnification costs.
Furthermore, reducing the threat that an auctioneer will be exposed
to liability in an auction will reduce the bidders' uncertainty over the
103 An English auction, also known as an open or oral auction, is the form of auction frequently
used for selling artwork, antiques, and estates. In such an auction, bidding is done orally or by
signal, and the price rises as bidding ensues. When nobody is willing to bid higher, the last bidder
wins and pays the amount of his bid. See supra notes 80 and 92 for definition of a sealed-bid auction.
104 A judge is disqualified from presiding over any matter in which she has a financial or property
interest that could be affected by the outcome of the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1988);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l) (1990).
Thus, for instance, a judge is disqualified from presiding over a case if the judge's fees will be paid
from court costs assessed by the judge. Taylor v. Public Convalescent Serv., 267 S.E.2d 242 (Ga.
1980).
105 Of course, companies often have a choice between filing for bankruptcy or trying to sell the
company before entering bankruptcy. Events may, however, overtake a company that waits too long
to sell itself. Apparently, this is what happened to FNN. It had already negotiated its sale to CNB
prior to filing for bankruptcy, but another potential bidder objected to the agreement and forced an
auction by the bankruptcy court. In re Financial News Network, Inc., 931 F.2d 217, 218-19 (2d Cir.
1991).
Sellers may also have the ability to engage in forum-shopping in deciding where they file their
bankruptcy proceedings.
106 Cf. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case For Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127, 136-37 (1986) (judges may be unable to value accurately firms in bankruptcy because they
"enjoy no benefit and suffer no cost" if they overvalue or undervalue firms).
107 See generally Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991).
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value of the item being auctioned. This could result in lower charges for
auctioneer services and higher net revenues for the seller of the goods. 108
Judicial auctioneers would have no potential liability, even if the auction-
eer function were delegated to a master, minimizing the real cost of auc-
tioneer services. Where the value of the goods being auctioned is
substantial, as it would be in a multimillion dollar lawsuit, these cost
savings are also likely to be very substantial. 10 9
Nor are the parties to the auction left unprotected from judicial
abuses. The auctioneer judge has a duty to act to maximize revenues for
the seller,110 and a fiduciary duty to protect the class's interests.111
Where the judge acts as an auctioneer without referring the matter to a
master, the seller may save on the costs of employing an auctioneer.
1 12
Finally, the parties can always appeal from the court's or the master's
final orders. 113
There are some other important advantages to using judges as auc-
tioneers. One fundamental result of auction theory is that auction reve-
nues will be maximized, on average, if the auctioneer commits herself in
advance to the rules of the auction and then enforces those rules.
1 14
Judges can fix hard and fast rules for auctions, subject of course to appel-
late review for abuse of discretion, thereby insuring that bidders put their
best bids forward instead of holding back in hopes of getting the lawsuit
108 Cf Thomas & Hansen, supra note 70, at 1183-84. Briefly put, corporate auctioneers are nor-
mally indemnified by the seller for any liability they may incur in conducting the auction. The cost
of this indemnification to the seller is uncertain because the purchaser will ultimately have to assume
the indemnification obligation, which, therefore, makes the value of the company being sold uncer-
tain. Bidders, therefore, will lower their valuations by more than the expected value of the loss. Id.
For a general discussion of the role of director insurance and indemnification in the context of class
action and derivative settlements, see Alexander, supra note 1, at 550-57.
109 Since the American legal system generally provides judges' services at a low cost to private
parties, private litigants may already realize little additional benefit from reducing the costs of using
judges. See supra note 12 for an example of this subsidy. Thus, any savings realized from judicial
immunity from suit would largely be enjoyed by society. The cost of auctioneer services to the seller
would, however, be positive if the court chose to delegate the auctioneer function to a master because
the costs of the master could be assessed against the monies obtained in the auction.
110 See In re Todem Homes, Inc., 51 B.R. 883, 887-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (in a bankruptcy
auction, the governing principle of judicial approval is obtaining "the best price for the bankruptcy
estate").
111 See Oracle I, 131 F.R.D. 688, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
112 If the injured plaintiff does not bear these costs, society will need to expend its judicial re-
sources in performing these services.
113 Appellate review can be an effective means of insuring that the auction is not prematurely
terminated. In the FNN auction, Dow Jones, a disappointed bidder in the first round of bids, ap-
pealed from the bankruptcy court's decision to award FNN to CNB, despite Dow's higher bid,
because of Dow's failure to match the conditions imposed by the court on all bids. FNNI, 126 B.R.
152, 154-55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). The district court reversed the Bankruptcy Court's order,
finding that the lower court ruling "failed to further the interests of creditors, equity holders, and the
debtor". Id. at 156.
114 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 80, at 703. See also supra note 93.
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for very little.1 15
Macey and Miller recognize that collusion among the relatively
small number of plaintiff's law firms is a real danger to the auction pro-
cedure. 116 Collusion can take the form either of explicit agreements
about which bidder will win the auction or the form of implicit under-
standings among the bidders to exercise restraint in bidding. 117 How-
ever, sellers can offset the potential effects of such a cartel by setting
secret and undisclosed reservation prices for their goods. 118
Further, judges are well-positioned to fight collusion among the auc-
tion bidders.1 19 Many trial court judges are former litigators and have
the experience needed to set reservation prices for lawsuits. 120 Also, the
bidders in the auction are well aware that the judge who is auctioning the
case is the same judge who will be trying the case, if necessary. This
provides them ample incentive to avoid even the appearance of partici-
pating in collusion in the bidding process. 121
The existing judicial framework for handling regular cases provides
another reason why judges are good auctioneers. Judges can use the cur-
rent rules for discovery and pretrial procedure to control the bidders'
initial discovery about the value of the lawsuit. Alternatively, the judge,
or a party designated by the judge, might be charged with conducting all
of the preauction discovery. 122
115 The possibility of appellate review of the auction result insures that courts do not create overly
restrictive rules for the auction (or apply those rules unfairly). For example, in FNN I the district
court admonished the bankruptcy court for disqualifying a higher bid from consideration by being
overly restrictive in its application of the auction rules. Court-imposed rules, the Court stated, are to
"ensure fair comparability between competing bids or to protect other bidders who have limited
their bids to the announced terms." FNN I, 126 B.R. at 156. The disqualified bid was $10 million
more than the bid that was accepted. "[Tihe interests of the creditors, equity holders and the
debtor" required the bankruptcy court to consider the higher bid. Id.
116 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 111. Macey and Miller believe that this danger is relatively
slight because of the threat of disbarment or criminal prosecution of the attorneys involved in price
fixing. Id.
117 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 80, at 724-25.
118 Auction theory predicts that this reservation price should be set by taking into account the
seller's own optimal valuation of the goods and the number of cartel members. Id. at 724-25. As the
number of cartel members increases, the seller's anticartel price should increase. Thus the effect of
collusion is to raise the reservation price to a higher level than would be the case if there were no
collusion. Id. at 725.
119 See supra note 2. Courts have monitored potentially collusive conduct between parties in
many different contexts. See, e.g., In re Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 1986)
(finding that allegations of collusion between buyer and seller, if proved, would destroy a purchaser's
good faith status).
120 Judges who do not feel confident in their abilities to set a minimum price for the lawsuit might
choose to appoint a special master who is sufficiently knowledgeable about the subject matter of the
lawsuit to do so.
121 Of course, the use of the auction process for lawsuits should also eliminate collusion in any
settlements negotiated between defendants and plaintiffs' counsel. See Oracle III, 136 F.R.D. 639,
647 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
122 See infra Part V.
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Masters would appear to enjoy most of the same advantages as
judges. For instance, they have immunity from suit for actions taken
within the scope of their judicial activities and they can conduct discov-
ery. Masters, however, create two problems that judges do not. First,
who will bear the costs of their sprvices? The court could charge bidders
an auction entry fee to defray these costs. In the end though, these costs
probably will be passed through by the bidders in the form of lower bids.
Second, and more importantly, when masters are employed as auc-
tioneers a question arises as to whether the bidders, knowing that the
master will not be trying the case, will be more likely to engage in ob-
structionist behavior. For example, bidders could file frequent appeals of
the master's procedural rulings on the conduct of the auction thereby
delaying the proceeding. In part, this problem may become less impor-
tant over time as the bidders become more familiar with the bidding pro-
cess and the rules for conducting these auctions become generally
accepted. However, the master will have a difficult job and will need the
court's support to keep the bidders from contesting her every decision.
In summary, we believe that the benefits of using judges as auction-
eers outweigh the costs. While the lack of a market incentive for judges
to perform their auctioneer duties is of concern, there are several mecha-
nisms in place that encourage judges to act in the seller's best interests.
For these reasons, we believe judges would make good auctioneers for
lawsuits.
IV. WHEN SHOULD CLASS-ACTION AND DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS BE
AUCTIONED?
A. Are Auctions the Answer?
Scholars have been fascinated with the conduct of auctions for many
centuries. 123 A wide array of goods are sold at auctions: artwork, books,
antiques, mineral rights, treasury bills and gold, are a few current exam-
ples; wives and slaves are historical examples.124 In recent years, corpo-
rations have been sold by auction; this procedure has sparked
considerable academic debate.125 The main attraction of auctions is that
they allocate goods to the user that attaches the highest value to them
and maximize revenue for the seller.
As the large theoretical and empirical literature on auctions demon-
123 Martin Shubik, On Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting, in AUCTIONS, BIDDING AND CON-
TRACTING: USES AND THEORY 3-4, (Englebrecht-Wiggans, et al. eds., 1983). See generally, David
W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 153, 192
(1986); Macey, supra note 10, at 85.
124 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 80, at 701; Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of
Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982); see also LEAB & LEAB, supra
note 89, at vii-viii.
125 See, eg., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1990);
Leebron, supra note 123; Macey, supra note 10.
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strates, however, auctions are not a costless market mechanism. Auc-
tions involve transaction costs for a variety of reasons, but the most
important of these for our purposes stems from the uncertainty and costs
of collecting and analyzing information. We discuss the nature of these
costs below. We conclude this Part of the Article with a discussion of the
conditions under which auctions will tend to operate as an efficient mech-
anism for transferring the legal rights of claimants.
B. Common Value Auctions Imply that Expected Auction Proceeds
Are Less than Expected Settlement
Under conditions likely to hold in auctions of lawsuits, the average
price received through an auction process will necessarily be less than the
average value of the lawsuit to the winning bidder. This inequality re-
flects the transaction costs of conducting an auction. To understand
when an auction will be better than the current practice therefore re-
quires a good understanding of these transaction costs.
To begin developing such an understanding, suppose that a lawsuit
is being considered for auction, and for ease of exposition initially, sup-
pose that all potential prosecuting attorneys would be equally adept at
conducting the case. Then there is no allocation problem, in an eco-
nomic sense, in deciding which attorney to give the case to; whichever
attorney gets the case, the expected outcome will be the same. In auction
theory, this is referred to as a common-value auction. 126
Although the final decision as to which attorney gets the case does
not matter in this situation, there is still the crucial problem of determin-
ing how much the assigned attorney will pay for the case and, of course,
how much the plaintiffs will therefore receive. Uncertainty over the
value of the lawsuit-that is, what the costs of litigation and any settle-
ment amounts will be-makes the determination of this price a difficult
one. Auctioning the lawsuit to the highest bidder is a natural way to
determine the price, and in fact an auction is probably the best way to
126 Thus, we are for now ignoring one agency cost that is commonly recognized in current prac-
tice: that associated with inefficiency in the selection of the plaintiff's attorney. We feel that this
inefficiency is important and that an auction will attenuate the inefficiency (for an auction will find
the low-cost attorney). But in order to discuss the major transaction cost associated with auctions, it
is easiest to deal with a common-value model. However, this assumption could be relaxed. Auction
theory currently includes two polar models, the common-value model and another known as the
independent private values model. In the former, the value of the item being sold is uncertain but is
the same to all bidders; in the latter, each bidder knows the value of the item to himself but each
bidder's value will be different (hence the term independent private values). Most real auctions will
have both common-value and independent private values characteristics; auctions of lawsuits un-
doubtedly will. A model that deals with such auctions has been developed, see Milgrom & Weber,
supra note 124, but it is considerably more complex than a simple common-value model. Since the
major transaction cost we focus on arises from common-value characteristics, we choose to conduct
the discussion solely in a common-value context. Adapting the discussion along Milgrom and
Weber's lines would not change any of our conclusions.
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determine price, if a price must be determined.12 7
But this does not mean that the auction is perfect. Let E(v) be the
expected value of the lawsuit (expected settlement proceeds less expected
costs to any of the potential attorneys). We assume here that v, the true
value of the lawsuit, will only be known ex post so that ex ante there is
uncertainty over v. A basic result from common-value auction theory is
that E(p) < E(v), where E(p) is the expected price in the auction. 128
There are two related explanations for this important result. First,
common-value auctions potentially involve what is known as the "win-
ner's curse" phenomenon. 129 Put simply, this refers to the fact that the
winning bidder in a common-value auction will tend to be the bidder
who thinks the item for sale is worth the most, and this means that he
has a value estimate that is biased high.130 Recognizing that auctions
select the high-valued bidder, rational bidders will bid lower so that if
they win the auction they will not overpay and suffer the winner's curse.
This low bidding on the part of all bidders puts downward pressure on
the auction price; the result is that E(p) < E(v).
A second explanation for this result also arises out of the uncer-
tainty over the true value of the item being sold. Uncertainty means that
individual bidders will have different estimates of the item's true value.
In thinking about an optimal bid, a bidder will therefore have incentive
to bid low, for there will be a good chance that the next-highest value
estimate will be significantly beneath his own. This difference between
bidders' value estimates is key in determining how much beneath their
value estimates profit-maximizing bidders will bid; if the difference is
small, then bids will be relatively close to value estimates because other-
wise they will be likely to lose the auction to the next-highest bidder. If
the difference in value estimates is large, then bidders can strategically
"shave" their bids by a significant amount, for the risk of losing to the
next-highest bidder is relatively low. These arguments imply that plain-
tiffs cannot expect to get the true value of the lawsuit via an auction.
Instead, the winning bidder retains some of the value, for the simple rea-
son that bidders expect to profit by participating in lawsuit auctions.131
127 Note however, that the current system of litigating lawsuits does not determine an ex ante
price.
128 For a formal proof of this result, see Douglas K. Reece, Competitive Bidding for Offshore
Petroleum Leases, 9 BELL J. ECON. 369, 380 (1978).
129 The winner's curse has been raised as a possible explanation for bidder overpayment for take-
over targets. See Black, supra note 125, at 625; Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197, 197-200 (1986); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premi-
ums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1274 (1990).
130 A bidder's value estimate can be thought of as the average value that the bidder estimates the
item to have, given the information that the bidder then possesses.
131 This profit is economic profit. Because of uncertainty, competition with a fixed number of
bidders does not fully compete away all profit. The assumption that there are a fixed number of
bidders is relaxed below.
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The difference E(v) - E(p) is therefore the transaction cost to the plain-
tiffs of using the auction.
Of course, the auction yields significant benefits as well. Denote the
expected settlement proceeds to plaintiffs under the current, nonauction
system as E(s). We must have E(v) > E(s), for v is just the settlement
when the case is run efficiently under one owner; s will be less than v if
there are any agency costs at all associated with many plaintiffs and one
attorney. Unfortunately, theory alone cannot tell us whether E(s) ex-
ceeds E(p), or vice versa. We return to this important issue below,132 but
for now, we note two results from auction theory that suggest the condi-
tions under which an auction will be the best choice for plaintiffs:
(1) As the number of bidders goes up, E(p) increases. 133
(2) As bidders' uncertainty over the item's value decreases, E(p)
increases. 134
Thus, an auction should perform better when either the number of bid-
ders is large or uncertainty over the lawsuit's outcome is low.
It may appear that uncertainty and the number of bidders could be
controlled by a judge so as to ensure low auction transaction costs, that
is, to ensure that E(p) is close to E(v). Uncertainty could be reduced by
having open and full discovery before the auction, and the number of
bidders could be increased via wide dissemination of an auction prospec-
tus. As it turns out, however, it is probably more correct to think about
the number of bidders in an auction as an endogenous variable, 135 with
potential bidders selecting whether or not to participate in the auction on
the basis of expected profit from participation. 136 But first, we must dis-
pense with the issue of having the defendant as a bidder.
C. Having the Defendant as a Bidder Reduces the Expected Price
One intriguing aspect of auctioning lawsuits is that the defendant
could also participate as a bidder. If the defendant wins the auction, he
is in effect settling the case at the amount of his winning bid. It would
seem desirable to have the defendant as a bidder, for otherwise one would
foreclose this possibility of obtaining a settlement.
Our analysis, however, points to the opposite conclusion. By al-
lowing the defendant to bid, the possibility exists for settlement via the
132 See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
133 See French & McCormick, supra note 10, at 439.
134 This result was proved in Milgrom & Weber, supra note 124, at 1102. See also McAfee &
McMillan, supra note 80, at 722 (also giving a restatement of this result).
135 An endogenous variable is a variable that cannot logically be taken as a constant in the analy-
sis and instead must be considered as one of the implications of the analysis. In the case at hand, the
number of bidders is endogenous because it will vary depending upon the specifics of the auction
being considered.
136 Part IV.D below addresses this issue in depth.
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auction, but the price at which settlement will occur can be expected to
be relatively low. Indeed, even if settlement does not occur in the auc-
tion (that is, the defendant does not win), the expected price will still be
relatively low. These conclusions follow from what appears to be a very
reasonable assumption: that the defendant has better information than
other bidders on the probable outcome of the case.
Asymmetric information-where one bidder knows more than
others-is anathema to auction prices, for it exacerbates the "winner's
curse" problem described earlier. 137 Intuitively, as a nondefendant bid-
der, one can understand the fear associated with winning an auction
where a knowledgeable defendant is bidding: a win means that the de-
fendant bid less than you, and that probably means that he does not fear
a lawsuit very much-or, at least, that he thinks the lawsuit will cost him
less than the winning bid. Nondefendant bidders then face an adverse
selection problem, with their probability of winning being greater when
the defendant thinks the lawsuit will cost him little. Recognizing this,
rational bidders will bid low, and the result is that the plaintiffs will re-
ceive relatively less for their case: that is, E(p) will be significantly less
than E(v).
Since plaintiffs are hurt by including the defendant as an auction
participant, defendants should be prohibited from bidding. This does not
adversely affect settlement, however, for settlement between the winning
bidder and the defendant can occur anytime after the auction is over.138
Indeed, one would expect that immediately after an auction the first step
of the winning bidder would be to pay a visit to the defendant and see if a
settlement could not be quickly reached. But importantly, after the auc-
tion is over, settlement does not have to occur at any specific point in
time. Instead, the winning bidder can be flexible, employing an optimal
strategy of further discovery and negotiation to maximize his expected
payoff. By forcing bidders to consider settlement with a more knowl-
edgeable defendant at the time of the auction, plaintiffs lose flexibility
and necessarily also lose revenue. 139
137 See Milgrom, supra note 81, at 5-6 for a discussion of this problem.
138 This raises an important issue: Can settlement occur before the auction? This might be desira-
ble from an efficiency point of view, as well as from the plaintiffs' profit-maximizing perspective, for
it circumvents a costly discovery process. We do not, however, see how it can occur without the
court making a determination of who will represent the class in the same manner that the current
system works. The purpose of the auction is to reduce the agency costs incurred in the current
system by selecting an attorney who has the proper incentives to accept a settlement or litigate the
case; early settlement stops that from occurring.
139 Another interesting question is would the plaintiffs want the auction price to be revealed to
the defendant (assuming that the defendant does not bid)? Negotiation strategy suggests that the
answer is "no": the auction price reveals considerable information to the defendant about what the
winning bidder thinks the lawsuit is worth. Bidders would be willing to pay more in the auction if
they had the freedom to choose whether to reveal or not reveal their winning bid. Practical consid-
erations, such as the need to pay the plaintiffs, would, however, probably require this information to
be revealed. In the final analysis, revealing this information may not provide the defendant with
87:423 (1993)
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D. Amount of Discovery and the Number of Bidders
Having resolved the issue of defendant as bidders, we can now re-
turn to the issues concerning discovery and the number of bidders. We
showed above that, with uncertainty over the value of the lawsuit, E(p)
< E(v). One would think that this inequality could be improved upon
by either reducing uncertainty or increasing the number of bidders. Un-
fortunately for plaintiffs, increasing auction revenue is not as simple as
that.
Consider first the idea of reducing bidders' uncertainty by providing
a more complete preauction discovery process. Macey and Miller would
authorize the judge to make an initial "limited" examination of the de-
fendant to gather the information necessary to evaluate the claim. 140
This information would then be made available to potential bidders. 141
There are at least two costs to this discovery, one which the plain-
tiffs probably bear and one which they will certainly bear. The first cost
of discovery we shall label the administrative cost. By this we mean such
common costs as deciding what materials and witnesses to obtain, and
providing for physical facilities and experts for depositions. These costs
would likely be borne initially by the court, and it would seem reasonable
to subtract them from the auction proceeds. The larger these common
administrative costs are, the smaller the recovery will be to the plaintiff
class. 142
The second component will be referred to as the analysis costs. By
much more information than a plaintiff's attorneys' early settlement offers do under the existing
system.
140 Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 106. They would also have the court ask the filing attorney
to conduct further inquiry into the merits of the suit and appoint a master to further investigate the
facts. The potential pitfalls of having judicially-conducted discovery have been noted by several
commentators. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2240-41 (1989) (pointing to possible civil
liberty concerns); John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 1004 (1990) (arguing that judicially led discovery creates danger
of "crusading judges"). If, however, such a proposal is not adopted, then each bidder would have to
determine what level of initial discovery to engage in, the defendant would likely resist these inquir-
ies into its affairs, and the court would become embroiled in numerous discovery disputes at a very
early stage in the litigation.
141 A two-step procedure similar to that employed by corporate auctioneers could be employed.
Corporate auctioneers distribute selected public information about the company they are selling to
potential bidders in the first step of the corporate auction process. This sales memorandum serves to
inform potential bidders about the basic facts of the suit so that they can determine whether they
wish to invest the resources needed to learn more about the company. In the second step of the
auction process, serious bidders are given more detailed, nonpublic information about the company
on which to base their bids. Thomas & Hansen, supra note 70, at 1152-56.
142 These costs may be offset by the value to the parties of accelerating the process of determining
the value of the claim. Presumably, the defendants would be forced in such a system to respond to
the court's inquiries promptly and thereby quickly form their own (preliminary) estimates of the
value of the claims involved much earlier than they do under the current discovery system. Plaintiffs
would also obtain access to defendants' evaluations of the claim's value at an earlier stage than they
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this we mean the costs incurred by bidders in analyzing discovery data in
order to arrive at an estimate of value of the lawsuit. This evaluation
process must necessarily be an intensive, complicated process. Potential
bidders must arrive at estimates of either (1) the likely settlement value of
the case, or (2), and obviously related, a combination of the likelihood of
winning a suit at trial and the likely damages forthcoming if the suit is
won. Arriving at these estimates will require potential bidders to ex-
amine both depositions and all available evidence, and to evaluate the
data. Most important, the whole process of analysis must be repeated by
every potential bidder. Thus, while administrative costs are only incurred
once, analysis costs are incurred as many times as there are bidders.
How will these costs affect the auction process? Take first the analy-
sis costs. Assume that the level of preauction discovery can be varied by
the judge, and denote the chosen level by D. Since it is reasonable to
assume that analysis costs will vary with the level of discovery, we will
denote the costs by A(D). In deciding whether or not to participate in
the auction-and this is certainly a decision which every potential bidder
will address-a potential bidder must assess the likelihood that any prof-
its from winning the auction will cover A(D), his analysis costs. But a
potential bidder's expected profit from participating in the auction de-
pends upon the number of bidders in the auction: with more bidders, the
higher the expected price and the lower the bidders' expected profits.
These relationships imply that the number of bidders in an auction will
be endogenously determined. 143
do presently. As a result, suits may settle quicker after the auction than they do under the system
currently in place.
143 This analysis is presented in French & McCormick, supra note 10; see also Ronald N. John-
son, Auction Markets, Bid Preparation Costs and Entrance Fees, 55 LAND ECON. 313, 313-17 (1979).
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A(D) = Analysis Costs
[ E (profit)
Number of Bidders
N*
Diagram 1
Equilibrium Number of Bidders
Diagram 1 illustrates the equilibrium. 144
In Diagram 1, the curve labeled E(profit) depicts the declining prof-
its of any one bidder as the number of bidders increases. The line A (D)
simply shows the constant analysis costs incurred by any one bidder.
Bidders should enter the auction until A (D) = E(profit), so that N* is the
equilibrium number of bidders.
The main point of this analysis is that the number of bidders cannot
naively be thought of as freely variable by an auctioneer/judge. This
supports the argument that auction performance cannot be simply im-
proved via broader solicitation of interest.
The equilibrium of Diagram 1 can be interpreted in a way that sheds
additional light on why E(p) < E(v), and on how great the difference
between these two amounts will be. With N* homogeneous bidders in
the auction, it must be that each has a probability of winning equal to 1/
N*. Thus, we can write any one bidder's expected profit as
E(profit) = 1/N* (E(v) - E(p)) (1)
and since E(profit) = A(D) in equilibrium, it follows that
E(v) - E(p) = N* A(D) (2)
Equation (2) says that E(p) will be less than E(v) by the analysis costs
times the number of bidders in the auction. Or, in other words, the plain-
tiffs end up bearing the analysis costs incurred by all the bidders. This
interpretation of the auction equilibrium shows how important analysis
costs are to the plaintiffs' revenues.145
144 An equilibrium in relation to the number of bidders occurs when, given the number of bidders
planning to enter an auction, (a) no more bidders would find it profitable to enter, and (b) all of those
planning to enter would find it profitable to stay by their decision to do so.
145 Intuitively, the auction market must provide enough profit in total to cover the "industry's"
(the bidding firms') total costs. If profits are not large enough to cover costs, firms will exit as they
would in any industrial setting when losses are being made.
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Taking the analysis one step further, we should consider that D, the
level of discovery, is a variable that can be determined by the auctioneer/
judge. Allowing more discovery preauction will reduce bidders' uncer-
tainty, but it also implies a higher analysis cost. There are therefore po-
tential offsetting effects on plaintiffs' revenues: although reducing
uncertainty raises the expected price for any given number of bidders, if
A(D) were to increase, N* could potentially decrease and that would re-
duce expected auction revenue. Furthermore, there is the additional ad-
ministrative cost of more discovery.
In summary then, while there will generally be an optimal level of
discovery, it is difficult to describe analytically the nature of that opti-
mum. Qualitatively, it would seem safe to say that discovery should be
limited to material that can significantly lower bidders' uncertainty as to
damages and likelihood of winning at trial. Information that is costly to
analyze and that is unlikely to have a material impact on lawsuit valua-
tion should not be produced by discovery.
V. AUCTIONING LAWSUITS: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
A. When Would An Auction System Work?
When will an auction produce more revenue for plaintiffs than cur-
rent procedure? At a broad level, this is easy to answer. An auction will
be preferable when:
(a) Costs of the current system for the lawsuit in question are
large; and
(b) For the lawsuit in question, E(p) is close to E(v).
It is possible to further define these conditions so as to give at least quali-
tative advice to judges in deciding whether or not to auction a lawsuit.
We believe that the main variables to be considered when determin-
ing whether to employ an auction are (1) the level of uncertainty over the
lawsuit's value and (2) a related variable, the cost of resolving the uncer-
tainty through a process of discovery and analysis, preauction. Overall,
we can refer to these variables as constituting the auction information
cost. When the auction information cost is high, current practice will
likely be the better option, for E(p) will be much less than E(v).
If auctions are to be used to allocate class action and derivative law-
suits, we need, one, to identify auction mechanisms that reduce bidders'
uncertainty without prohibitively high administrative and analysis costs,
and two, to provide the courts with some guidelines to help them identify
classes of cases where the uncertainty over the value of the lawsuits being
auctioned is likely to be low. We turn now to the first part of this
inquiry.
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B. Discovery Restrictions: Containing Analysis Costs and
the Auction Information Cost
For an auction to constitute an improvement over the existing litiga-
tion process, all bidders must have their uncertainty over the claim's
value reduced significantly, but without incurring either large adminis-
trative or analysis costs. It is important to treat all bidders equally in
regard to information disclosure; if some bidders are relatively unin-
formed, then they will have to reduce their bids just the same as if a well-
informed defendant were participating.
The auctioneer judge can control the amount of discovery that bid-
ders are allowed to obtain from the defendant. The first rule of an effi-
cient discovery process should be that bidders are prohibited from
pursuing discovery on their own. Instead, there should be one court-
sanctioned discovery process with the results common to all interested
bidders. Specifically, bidders should not be allowed to interview defend-
ants or witnesses without notifying the court and, if permission were
given to conduct the additional discovery, the resulting evidence should
be made publicly available.
For the first rule to be effective, another rule must also be followed:
no evidence that could significantly impact a bidder's view of the case
should be withheld. Put simply, the single, public discovery record must
be complete enough to allow bidders to come to reasonably certain esti-
mates of the case's value. If this record is complete enough, it will also
serve to reduce bidders' incentives to unilaterally attempt additional dis-
covery (as described above) for the value of any new information would
be low.
The goal of discovery should not be, however, to eliminate uncer-
tainty completely. If that were accomplished, then most likely too much
effort would have been spent on discovery. With all uncertainty re-
moved, settlement should occur immediately after the auction, for both
the defendant and the winner would agree on the outcome of any further
litigation. But mutually agreeable settlement can also occur without per-
fect information, so it is efficient to conduct the auction while some un-
certainty remains and then see if the winner and the defendant can come
to terms without any more costly litigation.
The second rule, or principle, of efficient discovery therefore re-
quires the auctioneer judge to evaluate each step of discovery in terms of
its cost and its potential contribution to reducing uncertainty. Under the
existing rules of civil procedure, judges already engage in a similar exer-
cise when evaluating discovery requests.146 The auction process would
require judges to balance the costs of obtaining additional information
against its potential to reduce the bidders' uncertainty about the value of
the claim. If the additional evidence being considered would most likely
146 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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have little impact on bidders' value estimates, and would only come at
considerable cost, then it should be excluded.
Balancing the cost of additional discovery against the reduction of
uncertainty about the value of the lawsuit in this way will help to in-
crease net revenues from the auction process. However, a more direct
route to this result would be to auction cases where bidders can form a
good assessment of the value of the case without much discovery. For
that reason, we next attempt to identify classes of cases where the auction
mechanism will be particularly appropriate because the level of uncer-
tainty about the value of the lawsuits is likely to be low.
C. Suits Where the Auction Information Costs Might Be Initially Low
What types of class and derivative actions might be relatively easy
for bidders to value? We believe that three classes of cases are likely
candidates: (1) cases where there has been prior factual or legal determi-
nations establishing the defendant's probable liability and damages; (2)
cases where the facts bearing on liability and damages are very clear cut;
and (3) strike suits where the facts pleaded in the complaint fail to allege
a cause of action. 147
A large number of class actions and derivative lawsuits are filed af-
ter a government regulatory or criminal action is made public. These
governmental prosecutions can result in factual findings that form the
basis for subsequent private litigation. For example, an SEC action
against a company, or an FTC price fixing investigation, may provide
significant evidence on the merits of a private claim for damages. This
evidence could give potential bidders accurate information about the ex-
pected value of the underlying legal claim and insure that E(p) is close to
E(v).
Cases where the facts bearing on liability and damages are very clear
represent a second category of cases where bidders may be more certain
about the value of the underlying claim. For example, in securities litiga-
tion, private claims under section 16(b) for short swing profits from cor-
porate insiders may be easy for bidders to value: if the insider has held
the securities for less than the statutory period and sold them for a profit,
then the corporation is entitled to recover an easily measurable amount
of damages.148 Claims that a prospectus contained false and misleading
statements brought under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act may be suscepti-
147 While these cases, we argue, will be easy to value, it is not necessarily true that they are also
cases where agency costs under the existing litigation process will be low. For example, if the plain-
tiff's attorney is compensated by the lodestar method, then that attorney still has incentive to bill as
many hours as possible in the conduct of the litigation. Thus, the cases we identify below are cases
where the auction information cost is probably low but the agency cost of the existing process might
be relatively high.
148 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
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ble to similar treatment. 149
Finally, suits that fail to state a claim on the face of the complaint
are likely to be susceptible to auction treatment. In these cases, filed
often on the basis of a press release announcing a major transaction, the
auction process would result in their sale for a nominal amount, less than
or equal to their nuisance value to the defendants. Auctioning these
cases would quantify their nuisance value which could hasten the settle-
ment process.
This list is intended to be suggestive of the types of cases that could
be beneficially handled using the auction process. Trial judges are usu-
ally experienced former trial lawyers who will have their own insights
into what cases will be best handled by an auction procedure. Further-
more, we would expect that if the auction procedure was utilized by the
courts, certain courts and judges would develop an expertise in deciding
when to apply it. For instance, the Delaware Chancery Court would be a
logical choice to test the usefulness of auctioning derivative lawsuits. A
specialized court could adopt routine procedures for determining what
cases to auction, how to conduct the auction and whom to allow to bid
that would greatly increase the efficacy of employing the auction process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The idea of auctioning class action and derivative lawsuits is provoc-
ative. Our analysis indicates that, from an economic perspective, an auc-
tion system has several serious limitations which could limit its
usefulness to a relatively small number of types of cases. However,
within these categories of cases, an auction mechanism has the potential
of eliminating serious agency problems and increasing recoveries to in-
jured plaintiffs.
For these cases, there are other significant benefits to an auction pro-
cess, in addition to the reduction in agency costs. For example, auction
proponents have shown that the auction process is likely to have the fol-
lowing results: (1) lowering transaction costs by eliminating the need for
courts to review the substance of many settlements and attorney fee re-
quests; (2) increasing efficiency in the deployment of plaintiffs' law firms'
resources because of the consolidation of the litigation in one entity
rather than the loose consortiums currently deployed; and (3) allocating
the resource-the legal claim-to the highest valued user, who is likely
to be the most qualified attorney.1 50
As a final note, we recognize that our analysis has focused only on
149 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). These claims may be more complex because the defendants
may be able to show that they conducted proper due diligence in supplying these documents.
150 These benefits are more fully explored in Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 108-10. These
authors also develop more fully several problems with the auction process that we do not explore
here. See id. at 110-16.
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the efficiency of auctions in yielding revenues for plaintiffs given that a
case has been brought. We have not examined in any depth the impact
that auctions would have on the number and type of cases that would be
brought forward. Yet, from an overall public policy perspective, this is
clearly an important question. The answer to this question-and the so-
cial welfare implications of the answer-does not seem obvious.
Although plaintiffs may end up with greater proceeds under an auction
process, the openly competitive nature of the auction should put down-
ward pressure on lawyers' fees. Coupled with this point is the issue of
how the attorney who first files the suit will recover her costs.151 Thus,
there may now be more cases that could potentially yield a positive finan-
cial return to plaintiffs, but the class of plaintiffs may find no attorneys
rushing to file suit on the plaintiffs' behalf. From a normative, or social
welfare, point of view, there would probably be many who would argue
that there are already too many class action and derivative lawsuits. If
auctions were to result in yet more, then the overall impact on welfare
would be negative. The current process could then be viewed as a sec-
ond-best solution. Although it creates additional costs in prosecuting
cases, these costs keep the number of cases brought in check.
Even given this last caveat, we remain optimistic that the auction
process is worthy of judicial experimentation and further development
for those cases where auction information costs are low.
151 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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